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THE USE OF THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE RULE
TO REVIEW ADMINISTRATIVE FINDINGS
OF FACT IN NEW MEXICO
ALBERT E. UTTON*
Administrative agencies in adjudicatory proceedings make findings
of fact in much the same way as do courts. Courts in reviewing
adjudicatory proceedings of administrative agencies are presented
with the question of how intensively they should review administrative findings of fact. The United States Supreme Court tried to answer that question in ICC v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad' when it
said that "[a] finding without evidence is arbitrary and baseless ....
A finding without evidence is beyond the power of the Commission.
An order based thereon is contrary to law and must.., be set aside
by a court of competent jurisdiction." 2 A finding of fact must therefore be based upon adequate evidence, and what constitutes adequate evidence is a question for the courts.
FEDERAL POSITION
The rule followed by most jurisdictions, including the federal
courts, dictates that the courts uphold the agency's finding of fact on
review if it is supported by "substantial evidence." ' 3 The formulations developed by the federal courts as to what constitutes substantial evidence are about as general and elastic as one might anticipate.
Beginning in 1938, with its decision in Consolidated Edison Co. v.
NLRB, 4 the U.S. Supreme Court said, "Substantial evidence is more
than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."' In its
1939 NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co.6 decision, the
Supreme Court elaborated and held that substantial evidence "means
evidence which is substantial, that is, affording a substantial basis of
fact from which the fact and issue can be reasonably inferred. ...
[1it must be enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to
direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it is
*Professor of Law, Univ. of New Mexico; B.A., Univ. of New Mexico (1953); M.A.
(Juris), Oxford University (1959).

1. 227 U.S. 88 (1913).
2. Id. at 91-92 (citations omitted).

3. See text accompanying notes 3-11 infra.
4. 305 U.S. 197 (1938).
5. Id at 229 (citations omitted).
6. 306 U.S. 292 (1939).
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one of fact for the jury."'7 Thus, it was established in the early
1940's that the federal rule called for upholding administrative findings of fact if they were supported by substantial evidence.
Immediately after the war, Congress, in an attempt to require the
courts to be more vigorous in their review of administrative decisions, amended the federal Administrative Procedures Act. 8 In that
1946 legislation, not only did Congress require that administrative
finding of fact be supported by "substantial evidence," it also required that in making such determinations, courts consider "the
whole record or those parts thereof cited by a party." 9 In the 1947
Taft-Hartley Act, 1 0 Congress also provided for review of the whole
record of administrative decisions by requiring that "[ti he findings
of the [National Labor Relations] Board with respect to questions of
fact if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as
a whole shall be conclusive."' 1
The United States Supreme Court decided what the "whole record" requirement signified in 1951. In the landmark case of Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB," 2 the Court reviewed the legislative history of the language from both the Administrative Procedures Act
and the Taft-Hartley Act and concluded that Congress did want the
courts to review the findings of fact by administrative agencies more
vigorously than they had in the past. Under the "whole record"
requirement, the court was to look not just at one side of the record
on review to see if there was "substantial evidence" which supported
the administrative agency's finding but was to look at the evidence as
presented in the entire record. After reviewing the evidence as presented in the entire record, the reviewing court was to decide
whether, on balance, the agency's decision was supported by substantial evidence.1 '
The federal courts have followed the legislative mandate and have
arrived at a position which requires not only that administrative
findings of fact be supported by substantial evidence, but also that
they be reviewed on the whole record. The entire record, or at least
those portions of the entire record cited by the parties, must be
looked at in evaluating whether the evidence is substantial. This position has been supported by Professor Jaffe who has said that the
7. Id. at 299-300 (citations omitted).
8. 5 U.S.C. § § 551-59 (1976).
9. 5 U.S.C. §556(d) (1976).
10. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. § § 141-87 (1976).
11. Id. at §160(e).
12. 340 U.S. 474 (1951).

13. Id. at 489-91.
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purpose of review of the "whole record" is to determine whether the
record provides
a rational or logical basis for the finding.

This must mean evi-

dence in the case and in the context of the case. To abstract out of a
case that part of the evidence which can be made to support a
conclusion is to imagine an abstract case, a case that was never tried.
..Evidence which may be logically substantial in isolation may lose

its logical relevance, even its claim to credibility, in context with
other evidence. The rationality or substantiality of a conclusion can
only be evaluated in the light of so much of the situation as is made
to appear.' 4

THE NEW MEXICO POSITION

New Mexico's position on the standard for review of administrative findings of fact is less than clear, but the New Mexico courts
usually follow the pre-1946 federal "substantial evidence" rule. Under
that rule, the reviewing court looks to see if there is reasonable
evidence to support the agency decision and ignores evidence to the
contrary.' s
This paper argues that not only would the New Mexico law be
clarified but also improved by expressly rejecting the substantial evidence test and replacing it with the whole record standard for judicial review of administrative findings of fact.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW MEXICO STANDARD OF REVIEW
In New Mexico, the development of the standard of review of
administrative findings of fact has been gradual and has gone through
several different formulations. In 1913, the New Mexico Supreme
Court, in the case of Seward v. Denver & Rio Grande Railroad,'6
said that it would not indulge in any presumption favoring the Commission's decision, but would review the evidence and form its own
independent judgment as to the "reasonableness and lawfulness" of
the Commission's order. 1 7 The court said, "While it is proper for the
Commission to make findings of fact, still such findings can have no
force or effect in this Court .... Our Constitution .

.

. requires this

Court to pass upon the merits of the case, without indulging in any
presumptions ....This Court forms its own independent judgment,
as to each requirement of the order, upon the evidence."' 8 Again, in
14. Jaffe, JudicialReview: Question of Fact,69 Harv. L. Rev. 1020, 1027 (1956).
15. Rinker v. New Mexico State Corp. Comm'n, 84 N.M. 626, 506 P.2d 783 (1973).
16. 17 N.M. 557, 131 P. 980 (1913).

17. Id. at 583, 131 P. at 989.
18. Id
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1913, the New Mexico Supreme Court, in the case of Woody v.
Denver & Rio Grande Railroad,1 ruled that orders of the Corporation Commission must be supported by factual evidence. The court
stated, "This court can determine the reasonableness and lawfulness
of an order made by the Commission only upon the evidence adduced before the Commission." 2 0
In later cases, the New Mexico Supreme Court proceeded to reformulate the "reasonableness and lawfulness" standard of the
Seward case into a formula requiring that findings of fact by the
Corporation Commission be supported by "substantial and satisfactory evidence." 2 In 1923, in Kinney v. New Mexico Midland Railroad,2 2 the court upheld the Corporation Commission's finding
regarding the justice of' 2 freight rates because it was supported by
"satisfactory evidence." 3 In its 1931 decision in San Juan Coal &
Coke Co. v. Santa Fe S.J. & N. Railway,2" the court observed,
"Previous decisions in rate cases have developed the rule that the
commission's order or findings will not be disturbed if supported by
satisfactory and substantial evidence." '2 By 1954, in its decision in
State Corp. Commission v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph
Co.,26 the New Mexico Supreme Court cited the Seward "lawfulness
and reasonableness" standard, but said that "findings will not be
disturbed if supported by satisfactory and substantial evidence."' 2 7 It
is noteworthy, however, that although the phraseology has changed
over the years, the New Mexico standard of review has remained one
of reasonableness. 2 8
The standard of review remains the same regardless of which type
of agency's fact finding is being reviewed by the courts. For example,
the State Corporation Commission is an agency created by the New
Mexico Constitution, rather than by the legislature. 2 9 The constitu19. 17 N.M. 686, 132 P. 250 (1913).
20. Id. at 694, 132 P. at 253.
21. See text accompanying note 27 infra.
22. 28 N.M. 451, 214 P. 754 (1923).
23. Id. at 455, 214 P. at 756.
24. 35 N.M. 512, 2 P.2d 305 (1931).
25. Id. at 519, 2 P.2d at 308 (citations omitted).
26. 58 N.M. 260, 270 P.2d 685 (1954).
27. Id. at 266, 270 P.2d at 689. The New Mexico Supreme Court cited the 1913 Seward
case, with its "reasonableness and lawfulness" standard. It also emphasized that "findings
will not be disturbed if supported by 'lawful and substantial evidence.' " The court held that
"the order of the commission is just and reasonable .... 58 N.M. at 271, 270 P.2d at 692.
28. Id. at 267, 270 P.2d at 690. The court seemed to be judging the review standard of
"satisfactory and substantial evidence" on whether it was reasonable.
29. N.M. Const. art. 11, § § 7 and 8. The Corporation Commission carries the unusual
power under the constitution to remove a case from the Commission to the supreme court.
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tion provides for the scope of review of some Commission decisions.' 0 In interpreting the language of the constitution, the courts
have enunciated a standard whereby Commission orders will not be
disturbed unless they are unsupported by substantial evidence. 3'
Review of other Commission decisions is provided for by statute. 3 2 In 1957, the New Mexico Supreme Court ruled on a statutory
challenge in Ferguson-Steere Motor Co. v. State Corp. Commission.3 3 The supreme court stated:
This Court has consistently held that the courts may not overrule
the acts of administrative officers on matters committed to their
discretion unless their actions are unlawful, unreasonable, arbitrary,
capricious, or not supported by evidence, and that in reviewing the

action of such bodies, the trial court is bound by the substantial
evidence rule, that is, whether the findings
of the administrative
34
body are supported by substantial evidence.

Hence, although the New Mexico Supreme Court has employed a
variety of formulations for reviewing the decisions of the constitutionally-created Corporation Commission, it has generally
followed a
' 3
standard of reasonableness and "substantial evidence. 5
Some agencies are created by the legislature rather than by the
constitution. In reviewing the decisions of those agencies, the court
has articulated variations on the theme of substantial evidence. The
New Mexico Supreme Court's decision in Baca v. Chaffin 3 6 illustrates some of these articulated variations. The supreme court, in
reviewing a finding of fact by the chief of the Liquor Control Division, a statutorily created agency, said, "There must be some substantial evidence of probative character to sustain the finding of the
liquor authority ....A finding without some evidence of probative

value would be arbitrary and baseless. ' 3 " Therefore, whether the
court is reviewing a constitutionally established agency such as the
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., Rinker v. New Mexico State Corp. Comm'n, 84 N.M. 626, 627, 506 P.2d

783, 784 (1973).
32. N.M. Stat. Ann. §65-2-66 (1978).
33. 63 N.M. 137, 314 P.2d 894 (1957).
34. Id at 144, 314 P.2d at 898 (citations omitted).
35. The New Mexico Supreme Court, it should be noted, has said that the substantial
evidence rule is different than the rule of reasonableness. The rule of reasonableness requires
that the court determine the reasonableness and lawfulness of an administrative order. If the
evidence sustains the reasonableness and lawfulness of an order, it will be upheld under the
rule of reasonableness. State Corp. Comm'n v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co, 58 N.M.
260, 266, 270 P.2d 685, 689 (1954).
36. 57 N.M. 17, 253 P.2d 309 (1953).
37. Id at 21, 253 P.2d at 311.
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Corporation Commission, or a legislatively created administrative
agency such as the Liquor Control Division, it uses the reasonableness standard of the substantial evidence rule.
The language of the substantial evidence rule is repeated throughout the case law. In Floeck v. Bureau of Revenue,3 8 the New Mexico
Supreme Court said that on review of an administrative finding of
fact, a court has "authority only to determine whether upon the
facts and law, the action of the Commissioner ...was based upon an

error of law or was unsupported by substantial evidence or clearly
arbitrary or capricious

....

-

In McWood Corp. v. State Corp.

Commission,40 the court said that "[w] here the findings are not
supported by substantial evidence, the order is neither lawful nor
reasonable ....-4 And finally, in its 1979 Public Service Co. of
N.M. v. New Mexico Public Service Commission,4 2 the court stated
that "[i] udicial review of a Commission's decision is limited to...
whether the Commission's decision is supported by substantial evidence." 4 3 The New Mexico courts have thus consistently followed
the "substantial evidence" language as a guide by which to measure
the intensity of their review of administrative findings of fact.
THE USE OF THE "SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE" RULE IN NEW MEXICO

The very word "substantial" is one with enough elasticity in it to
stretch from here to there and perhaps frustrate fastidious minds, but
what does the phrase "substantial evidence" really mean? The New
Mexico courts have wrestled with many different formulations, starting with "reasonableness and lawfulness," and ending with the generally accepted "substantial evidence" rule. The New Mexico Supreme
Court has attempted to define the term with greater precision. In
Wilson v. Employment Security Commission,4 4 the court said that
substantial evidence "means more than merely any evidence and
more than a scintilla of evidence and contemplates such relevant legal
evidence as a reasonable person might accept as sufficient to support
a conclusion." '45 In 1970 the New Mexico Court of Appeals, in attempting to define the term, said that "substantial evidence means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

44 N.M. 194, 100 P.2d 225 (1940).
Id. at 199, 100 P.2d at 228 (citation omitted).
78 N.M. 319, 431 P.2d 52 (1967).
Id. at 322, 348 P.2d at 55.
18 N.M. St. B. Bull. 430,431 (June 21, 1979).
Id. at 431.
74 N.M. 3, 389 P.2d 855 (1963).
Id. at 8, 389 P.2d at 858 (citations omitted).
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to support a conclusion."'

6

These definitions follow closely the

language of the United States Supreme Court which has said that
substantial evidence "means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."4 "
It is clear that the New Mexico standard for review of administrative fact findings is one of reasonableness. The question which must
be answered in each case is: Was the agency's decision reasonable,

based upon the evidence before it? It must, however, be noted that
in determining whether the agency's decision was in fact reasonably
supported by substantial evidence, the New Mexico courts follow the
Under that approach, the courts look
pre-1946 federal approach.4
only at that evidence which supports the agency decision while ignoring conflicting evidence.4" The position of the New Mexico courts
was clearly stated in Rinker v. New Mexico State Corp. Commission, " where the New Mexico Supreme Court said that in reviewing
an agency finding on appeal, "all reasonable inferences [are] indulged in support of the court or commission below, all evidence and

inferences to the contrary disregarded and the evidence viewed in the
aspect most favorable to the action of the court or commission
which is being appealed."'"
THE REQUIREMENT OF COMPETENT EVIDENCE UNDER NEW MEXICO'S
"LEGAL RESIDUUM" RULE

In addition to deciding whether an agency's decision was reasonably supported by substantial evidence, New Mexico courts must also
apply the "legal residuum" rule. The residuum rule requires a reviewing court to set aside an administrative finding unless it is supported
by some evidence that would be admissible in a jury trial. 5 2 It has
464 P.2d 918, 920
46. Wickerstam v. N.M. State Bd. of Education, 81 N.M. 188,-.,
(Ct. App. 1970).
47. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938) (citations omitted).
48. See, e.g., Rinker v. New Mexico State Corp. Comm'n, 84 N.M. 626, 627, 506 P.2d
783, 784 (1973).
49. Id. In so doing, the appellate courts apply the same "substantial evidence" standard
to administrative agencies as they apply to courts sitting without juries. The position is
stated clearly in Groff v. Stringer, where the court, in reviewing the finding of a court sitting
without a jury, stated:
It is fundamental that, if there is substantial evidence in the record to
support a finding, we are bound thereby. In deciding whether a finding has
substantial support, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to
support the finding, and any evidence unfavorable to the finding will not be
considered.
82 N.M. 180, 181, 477 P.2d 814, 815 (1970) (citations omitted).
50. 84 N.M. 626, 506 P.2d 783 (1973).
51. Id. at 627, 506 P.2d at 784.
52. See, e.g., Young v. Board of Pharmacy, 81 N.M. 5, 462 P.2d 139 (1969).
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been held that for evidence to be "substantial" in New Mexico, there
must be, somewhere within it, "at least a residuum of evidence competent under the exclusionary rules." ' I
Adoption of the "legal residuum" rule tends to negate one of the
basic policy reasons underlying the establishment of the administrative process. Administrative agencies were created, in part, to avoid
some of the delays and technicalities of judicial procedures, including
restrictive evidentiary rules. Yet by adopting this rule, the New Mexico courts require at least a residuum of legally competent evidence
under the evidentiary rules of those courts.
The New Mexico courts have been using the "legal residuum" rule
for some time. In Baca v. Chaffin, 4 the district court reversed an
order issued by the Liquor Control Division concerning the revocation of a liquor license. The supreme court, in affirming the district
court's decision, cited with approval the district court's finding that
" '[tI he record of the proceedings before the Chief of the Division of
Liquor Control fails to disclose any competent, credible, substantial
or relevant testimony .....
In the Ferguson-Steere Motor Co.
case, 5 6 the supreme court elaborated on the requirements, adding
that "[t Ihere must at least be such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support the conclusion ....Mere
uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence."' I The decisions indicate that, in order to meet New Mexico's review standard of "substantial evidence," an administrative
record must contain within it at least some evidence which is legally
competent in the courts.5 8
"I

53. Id. at 8, 462 P.2d at 142. The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Scott succinctly
outlined the development of the exclusionary rule as follows:
The basic rule of admissibility of evidence is that all evidence having probative value-that is, that tends to prove an issue, is admissible. In countries
where the civil law prevails that is clearly recognized. But in the common law
there were developed certain exceptions to that basic rule, for example, the
hearsay rule, which made certain evidence, though relevant and material, incompetent. That was because of the danger of prejudice to the party against
whom it was offered who would have no chance to cross-examine the source,
or the probative value of the evidence offered was small as compared to the
great prejudicial affect [sic] it might have. So-called "exceptions to the hearsay rule" are really not exceptions to the hearsay rule which is itself an
exception to the basic rule of admissibility, but are in reality limitations on
the hearsay exception.
State v. Scott, 111 Utah 9,
-, 175 P.2d 1016, 1021-22 (1947).
54. 57 N.M. 17, 253 P.2d 309 (1963).
55. Id. at 21, 253 P.2d at 311.
56. 63 N.M. 137, 314 P.2d 894 (1957).
57. Id at 144, 314 P.2d at 899 (citations omitted).
58. The court in Young v. Board of Pharmacy, 81 N.M. 5, 8, 462 P.2d 139, 142 (1969)
noted that the legal residuum rule is by no means unique to New Mexico; at least twentyone other states have adopted the rule.
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"Substantial evidence" refers, therefore, not only to the quantity
of the evidence, but also to the quality of the evidence. Quality of
evidence is precisely that with which the "legal residuum" rule is
concerned. No matter how much evidence there may be in an administrative record supporting the decision made by the administrative
agency, there must be at least some evidence which would be of a
quality admissible in a court of law under the exclusionary rules of
evidence. The New Mexico court decisions bear out this interpretation of the rule. They have used various adjectives to modify the
word "evidence." They have used the modifying adjective "substantial," but have also added to it "probative," "competent," and have
even, in Corporation Commission cases, required "substantial and
satisfactory" evidence.' 9 In determining what constitutes satisfactory evidence, there has been "lawyerlike inclination ' 6 0 toward legally "competent" evidence.
There has, however, been at least one case 6 1 wherein the New
Mexico Supreme Court, although citing the legal residuum rule with
approval, specifically noted the policy underlying the liberalized
rules for admission of evidence in administrative proceedings. The
court stated that "[tI he Commission is an administrative agency and
it is well established that the rules governing the admissibility of
evidence before administrative boards are frequently relaxed for the
purpose of expediting administrative procedure." 6 2 The court made
a key distinction when it noted that, although rules of admission of
evidence are relaxed in administrative proceedings, "[t] he rules relating to weight, applicability or materiality of evidence ' 6 3 are not
relaxed therein. Even though all sorts of relevant evidence may therefore be admitted in administrative proceedings, the crucial point is
what evidence may be relied on-for example, what evidence has
probative value-rather than what evidence may be admitted.
59. E.g., Baca v. Chaffin, 57 N.M. 17, 21, 253 P.2d 309, 311 (1953), where the New
Mexico Supreme Court confirmed a district court decision by holding that "[t] here must be
some substantial evidence of probative character to sustain the finding .. " The supreme
court approved the language in the district court opinion which said that the administrative
record failed to "disclose any competent, credible, substantial, or relevant testimony or
other evidence." Note that in Baca, the result would have been the same whether the legal
residuum rule language of "competent" evidence was used or whether a substantial evidence
standard was used. There was simply no substantial evidence in the record cited by the court
to support the finding of the liquor director. Id. at 21, 253 P.2d at 311. There was no need
for the trial court to even suggest the question of competent evidence since there was no
"evidence of probative value" in the record under any standard.
60. It is not surprising that lawyers and judges, who have been extensively trained in the
requirements of the rules of evidence, would be drawn to these technical rules.
61. Ferguson-Steere Motor Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 63 N.M. 137, 314 P.2d 894
(1957).
62. Id. at 143, 314 P.2d at 898.
63. Id.
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The standard used in the New Mexico Administrative Procedures
Act provides a reasonable answer to the question of what evidence
may be relied upon. The language of the Act looks to evidence "if it
is of a type commonly relied upon by reasonably prudent men in the
conduct of their affairs." '6 4 It would arguably be better if the courts,
rather than focusing on rules of admissibility (as in the legal residuum rule), focused on what evidence may be relied on once admitted
-that is, what evidence has probative value. The scrutiny of the
court should thus focus on what evidence may be relied on, not on
what evidence may be admitted. To use the words of the New Mexico Supreme Court in Baca v. Chaffin, "[tihere must be some substantial evidence of probative character to sustain the finding" of an
administrative agency. 6 I
This position finds further support if one compares the underlying
purposes the rules of evidence serve in administrative and in judicial
proceedings. The rules of evidence for administrative agencies must
accomplish two primary tasks. They must provide guidelines that will
ensure a complete and fair hearing. At the same time, they must be
flexible enough to be employed by the agencies while preserving the
informality and efficiency that are desirable in administrative proceedings. 6 6 In reviewing administrative findings of fact, therefore,
the focus should not be on whether certain evidence was competent
or legally admissible in a court of law, but rather on whether the
evidence was of a probative character. Was it of the type that reasonably prudent men would rely on in the conduct of their affairs? 6'
Was it in fact substantial evidence?
THE PARADOX OF THE NEW MEXICO POSITION
In answering the question of how intensively the courts should
review administrative findings of fact, the New Mexico Supreme
Court has said that evidence does not constitute substantial evidence
unless there is at least some evidence which has a quality which
would be of probative value. 6 8 On the other hand, the New Mexico
courts have largely shunned the "whole record" requirement set
forth in Universal Camera6 9 and subsequently used by the federal
64. N.M. Stat. Ann. §12-8-11(A) (1978). See also Utton, How to Stand Still Without
Really Trying: A Critique of the New Mexico Administrative Procedures Act, 10 Nat.
Resources J. 840, 848 (1970).
65. 57 N.M. 17, 21, 253 P.2d 309, 311 (1953).
66. Utton, supra note 64, at 848-49.
67. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 12-8-11(A) (1978).
68. Baca v. Chaffin, 57 N.M. 17, 21, 253 P.2d 309, 311 (1953).
69. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
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courts. Instead of looking at the whole record, namely those parts of
the whole record cited by both parties, the New Mexico courts have
chosen to look only at that side of the record which supports the
administrative determination. If, after looking at only one side of the
record, the court finds that there is substantial evidence to support
that side, the administrative decision is upheld. 70 In Rinker v. New
Mexico State Corp. Commission,7 1 the New Mexico Supreme Court
said: "Upon appeal ... all reasonable inferences [are] indulged in
support of the court or commission below ...

and the evidence

viewed in the aspect most favorable to the action of the court or
commission which is being appealed." 7 2
Using the Rinker standard, it seems that New Mexico appellate
courts must apply the same substantial evidence standard 7 3 to reviews of administrative decisions that they apply when reviewing
lower courts. Thus, in assessing what quality of evidence will be
required when reviewing administrative determinations of fact, New
Mexico courts on the one hand, apply the rather inflexible, legal
residuum rule, while on the other hand, they look only at one side of
the record. Using this "one-sided" standard, the courts resolve all
the agency's decision and disregard all
disputed facts in favor of
74
inferences to the contrary.
On reflection, Professor Jaffe's position advocating the necessity
of judicial review 75 seems to be a more reasonable one. Reason
dictates agreement with his final assertion that "[e]vidence which
may be logically substantial in isolation may lose its logical relevance,
even its claim to credibility, in context with other evidence." 7 6
. New Mexico, after starting out with the standard of review of
reasonableness used in the 1913 Seward case, 7 7 now seems to have
arrived, through the adoption of the legal residuum rule, at an unreasonable posture of judicial review. Although there are two sides to
any dispute, the New Mexico courts take the position that the quality of evidence can be determined by looking at only one side of a
record.7 8 Such a review standard does not provide New Mexico
70. See Seward v. Denver & Rio Grande R.R., 17 N.M. 557, 131 P. 980 (1913).
71. 84 N.M. 626, 506 P.2d 783 (1973).
72. Id. at 627, 506 P.2d at 784.
73. See Wickersham v. New Mexico State Bd. of Educ., 81 N.M. 188, 190-91,464 P.2d
918, 920-21 (Ct. App. 1970).
74. See Public Serv. Co. v. New Mexico Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 18 N.M. St. B. Bull. 430
(June 21, 1979) (citing with approval Rinker v. State Corp. Comm'n, 84 N.M. 626, 506
P.2d 783 (1973)).
75. See text accompanying note 14, supra.
76. Jaffe, supra note 14, at 1027.
77. 17 N.M. 557, 131 P. 980 (1913).
78. Rinker v. New Mexico State Corp. Comm'n, 84 N.M. 626, 506 P.2d 783 (1973).
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courts with a criterion likely to result in intensive review of administrative decisions. The desire to subject administrative determinations
of fact to closer scrutiny is precisely why Congress statutorily re79
quired the federal courts to use the "whole record" standard.
Logic appears to support the federal standard as opposed to the
New Mexico standard. The New Mexico position seems contradictory. The legal residuum rule calls for the application of rigid evidentiary rules in order to determine what constitutes competent evidence. At the same time the courts look only at that evidence which
supports the decision of the administrative agency. The courts refuse
to look at any evidence which might conflict with or contradict the
0
decision of an administrative agency." One might argue that New
rule is in itself protection
residuum
Mexico's adoption of the legal
courts can afford to be
the
against error by the agency, and therefore
conflicting evidence.
consider
or
permissive by refusing to examine
to examine the
satisfactory
Surely, however, it would be more
evidence and
the
of
credibility)
the
therefore
(and
reasonableness
than to
record
the
in
contained
evidence
other
then weigh it against
of
evidence.
rules
legal
technical
rigid
upon
rely
One might also argue that the legal rules have stood the test of
time. Yet one of the reasons for establishing administrative agencies
was to avoid some of the delays and technicalities of judicial procedures, including those of the exclusionary rules of evidence, thereby allowing agencies to gather the evidence as quickly and completely as possible without too much concern for the rules of
admissibility. The idea behind administrative hearings was to let all
relevant evidence in, avoid the technicalities of the exclusionary rules
of evidence, and then weigh the credibility of the evidence and act
on it as would reasonably prudent men.
A reasonable alternative has been codified in the Uniform Licensing Act. It provides that "[i In proceedings held under the Uniform
Licensing Act... boards may admit any evidence and may give
probative effect to evidence that is of a kind commonly relied on by
reasonably prudent men in the conduct of serious affairs."" Since
under this Act any relevant evidence may be admitted, the key question becomes one of deciding on which part of the evidence reliance
may be put. The answer is that credibility shall be given only to
2
Under the
that evidence relied on by "reasonably prudent men.""
''reasonably prudent man" test one accepts only evidence that would
79.
80.
81.
82.

Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
See, e.g., Rinker v. New Mexico Corp. Comm'n, 84 N.M. 626, 506 P.2d 783 (1973).
N.M. Stat. Ann. §61-1-11 (1978).
Id.
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be deemed to be substantial evidence by such a prudent man, rather
than engaging in an analysis of what is "legally competent."
In his treatise on administrative law, Kenneth Culp Davis argues
forcefully that reliance on the residuum rule is misplaced. He says
that "[p] erhaps the strongest reason against the residuum rule is the
lack of correlation between reliability of evidence and the exclusionary rules of evidence. The exclusionary rules were designed for
guiding admission or exclusion of evidence, not for weighing its reliability, and were designed for juries, not for administrators." 8 He
argues that reliability of evidence is the central question and that the
legal definition of "competent evidence" does not assure reliability. 4 Davis argues at length that evidence "must be judged in particular circumstances, not in the abstract." ' 8 5 The types of circumstances he suggests be given consideration in determining whether
evidence should be relied on or not are:
the alternative to reliance on the incompetent evidence; the state of
the Supporting and opposing evidence, if any; the policy of the
program being administered and the consequences of a decision
either way; importance or unimportance of the subject matter and
considerations of economy of government; the degree of efficacy or
lack of efficacy 8of6 cross-examination with respect to particular hearsay declarations.

It is particularly relevant for the agency and the reviewing court to
consider the policy being administered. Chief Justice Moise, writing
for the New Mexico Supreme Court in Young v. Board of Pharmacy, 8" said, "We deem the continued requirement of some compe83. K. Davis, Administrative Law Text 279 (3d ed. 1972).
84. Id. Specifically he reasons:
Reliability of evidence must be judged in particular circumstances, not in
the abstract. Because the residuum rule involves an abstract determination that
evidence which would be excluded in a jury trial is necessarily and in all
circumstances unreliable, it virtually assures that findings will be more often at
variance with truth than they would be if the reliability were judged in the
light of all the circumstances. Id.
Wigrnore takes much the same position in criticizing the rule:
[TI his "residuum of legal evidence," which is to be indispensable, will have
some necessary relation to the truth of the finding. But the "legal" rules have
no such necessary relation .... This "residuum" rule, then, is decidedly not
the wise and satisfactory rule for general adoption. ...Let us remember that
the greatest part of the community's industrial, commercial, financial activity
already functions on a solid basis of fact determined without any formal rules
of proof. Let us, here too, put our trust in men and minds, rather than in
rules.
1 J. Wigiore, Evidence 41-42 (3d ed. 1940).
85. Davis, supra note 83, at 279.
86. Id at 280.
87. 81 N.M. 5,462 P.2d 139 (1969).
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tent evidence a sound one; for in administrative adjudications where
a person's livelihood (a property right) is at stake, any action depriving him of that property must be based upon such substantial
evidence as would support a verdict in a court of law." 8"8 Chief
Justice Moise's position makes eminent sense where an administrative
action takes on the nature of a trial in deciding a case which might
take away one's livelihood. The court was considering the consequences of the decision of such an administrative action.
Davis concurs in the position taken by Justice Moise. 8 9 He advocates that the policy of the program being administered, the type
of administrative action being taken, and the consequences of the
particular decision be considered in determining the reliability of
specific evidence rather than deciding in the abstract on the basis of
whether the evidence is legally competent. 9 0 The U.S. Supreme
Court has also applied this line of reasoning in FTC v. Cement Institute.91 The Court stated:
[01 f course rules which bar certain types of evidence in criminal or
quasi-criminal cases are not controlling in proceedings like this,
where the effect of the Commission's order is not to punish or to
fasten liability on respondents for past conduct but to ban specific
in accordance with the general mandate of
practices 9for
2 the future
Congress.

In any move to discontinue the use of the residuum rule in New
Mexico, it is important to consider the alternatives to the rule and
the consequence of discontinuance when the court reviews administrative decisions. Davis suggests that the alternative to the residuum
rule is to
allow agencies and reviewing courts to exercise discretion in determining in the light of circumstances of each case whether or not
particular evidence is reliable even though it would be excluded in a
jury case. In the exercise of such discretion, agencies and reviewing
courts will in many circumstances find that particular hearsay or
88. Id. at 9,462 P.2d at 143.
89. Davis, supra note 83, at 280 where he advocates:
Just as in a criminal case we require proof beyond a reasonable doubt for a
conviction, good sense requires that we should refuse to revoke a professional
license solely on the basis of tenuous hearsay, even though the same tenuous
hearsay would be deemed enough to support an award of, say, a social security
benefit, or a veteran's benefit, or even workmen's compensation. In granting a
license an agency may sometimes appropriately rely on evidence which would
not be considered as a basis for the revocation of the license.
90. Id. at 279-80.
91. 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
92. Id. at 706.
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other so-called incompetent evidence has insufficient reliability.
Rejection of the residuum rule does not mean that an agency is
compelled to rely upon incompetent evidence; it means only that
the agency and the reviewing court are free to rely upon the evidence if in the circumstances they believe that the evidence should
be relied upon. Rejection of the residuum rule does not mean that a
reviewing court must refuse to set aside a finding based upon incompetent evidence; it means only that the court may set aside the

finding or refuse to do so as it sees fit, in accordance with its own
determination of the question whether the evidence supporting the
finding 9should be deemed reliable and substantial in the circumstances. 3
THE STATUS OF THE "WHOLE RECORD" REVIEW STANDARD
IN NEW MEXICO
The New Mexico courts have, at times, either used or appear to
have used the "whole record" concept in reviewing administrative
findings of fact. 9 4 The state legislature has also, on occasion,
adopted the "whole record" requirement, as for example in the New
Mexico Uniform Licensing Act. 9 1 It provides that the court, when
reviewing an administrative decision, may reverse that decision if it is
"unsupported by substantial evidence on the entire record as submitted .... "96 Young v. Board of Pharmacy9 7 was decided under
the Uniform Licensing Act, but it does not discuss the "entire record" provision. 9 '
Other legislative expressions of the "whole record" standard exist.
For example, the New Mexico Public Assistance Appeals Act 9 9 gives
the courts the power to set aside a decision of the agency if it is "not
supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole."' 00 The
New Mexico Administrative Procedures Act has an "entire record"
provision for judicial review,' 1 but the Act has not been made to
apply to any agency except the Human Rights Commission. 0 2
93. Davis, supra note 83, at 278 (emphasis added).
94. See, e.g., cases cited infra in notes 103-13.
95. N.M. Stat. Ann. § §61-1-1 to -31 (1978).
96. Id. at §61-1-20.
97. 81 N.M. 5,462 P.2d 139 (1969).
98. Id. Neither does the court in Seidenberg v. New Mexico Bd. of Medical Examiners
expressly concern itself with the "whole record" requirement of the Uniform Licensing Act.
That 1969 case was also decided under the Uniform Licensing Act. 80 N.M. 135, 452 P.2d
469 (1969).
99. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 27-3-1 to -4 (1978).

100. Id at §27-3-4(F)(3) (1978).
101. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 12-8-22 (1978).
102. See discussion in Utton, supra note 64, at 840-41.
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There are also several cases wherein the New Mexico courts either
may have or appear to have considered the whole record. In Garrett
Freight Lines Inc. v. State Corp. Commission,' 03 the supreme court
did not specifically discuss the "whole record" standard for review of
administrative findings of fact. However, it is possible to interpret
the court's decision as having found that the agency determinations
were supported by substantial evidence on the whole record. In that
case, the court appears to have considered testimony presented by
both sides in determining "whether the record discloses sufficient
evidence"' 04 to support the finding. Two years later, in the 1959
TranscontinentalBus System v. State Corp. Commission' ' decision, the court appears to have considered both favorable and unfavorable evidence in reviewing the extensive administrative hearing
record. The court concluded that "the testimony of the witnesses,
considered as a whole, affords a sufficient basis for the Commission's
order, notwithstanding the cross-examination may have lessened the
impact of the direct examination."' 06 Rinker v. New Mexico State
Corp. Commission' 0 7 is another case in which the New Mexico
Supreme Court seems to have considered evidence based on the
"whole record" on review. Justice Stephenson, immediately after
repeating the standard litany that in reviewing administrative decisions "all reasonable inferences [are] indulged in support of the...
commission ..., all evidence and inferences to the contrary dis103. 63 N.M. 48, 312 P.2d 1061 (1957).
104. Id. at 53, 312 P.2d at 1064.
105. 67 N.M. 56, 352 P.2d 245 (1959).
106. Id. at 59-60, 352 P.2d at 247-48 (emphasis added). It is revealing to quote the court
at greater length:
[0] n review our jurisdiction is likewise limited to a determination whether
the evidence before the Commission, and upon which the order was based, is
substantial in character. If the evidence is found to be substantial it follows
the order of the Commission is both legal and reasonable and the judgment
must be reversed, otherwise, it must be affirmed.
Bearing in mind the foregoing rules, we approach a most difficult task of
evaluating a record consisting literally of thousands of pages of testimony,
exhibits, etc. The record is so voluminous, we will not attempt to detail the
testimony. It is sufficient to say that at the hearing before the Commission
some 275 witnesses testified both pro and con, thereby presentinga direct
conflict in the evidence ....
Transcontinental concedes that Geronimo made out a case on direct examination but contends that the answers of its witnesses on cross-examination
so discredit their testimony as to renderthe evidence unsubstantial.We have
given careful consideration to this contention and conclude that the testimony of the witnesses, considered as a whole, affords a sufficient basis for
the Commission's order, notwithstanding a cross-examination may have lessened the impact of the direct examination.
Id. at 59-60, 352 P.2d at 247-48 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
107. 84 N.M. 626, 506 P.2d 783 (1973).
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regarded,"'08 stated "[siuffice it to say that we have carefully
examined those portions of the record cited by the parties in support
of their respective positions and are of the opinion that the evidence
is substantial." '1 09 The supreme court appears to say explicitly that
it has examined both sides of the record, and found the evidence to
be substantial on the record taken as a whole. Also of interest is the
supreme court's review of Ribera v. Employment Security Commission. 1 ' o The court stated that "based upon all of the evidence, we
find that there was substantial evidence to support the findings and
conclusions made by the Commission .

. . ."'

1 It appears that the

court did use the "whole record" approach and did look at evidence
presented by both sides.' 1 2 Thus, in spite of the directions of earlier
cases to look only at one side and disregard evidence to the contrary,
the New Mexico Supreme Court has, on occasion, looked at both
sides and weighed the evidence accordingly. This position was probably taken because it is so reasonable to do so.' I 3
In the 1979 case of Garcia v. New Mexico Human Services Department, ' '4 the court of appeals construed § 27-3-4(F) of the New
Mexico statutes,' ' ' which provides that the Human Services Department decisions shall be set aside if "not supported by substantial
evidence in the record as a whole."' 1 6 The court expressly held that
"[s] ubstantial evidence in this context is predicated upon consideration of all evidence in the record as a whole, and not just that which
supports the judgment as in other types of cases."'' ' Judge Hendley, writing for the court, added that it appeared to the court that
the Human Services Department had "ignored any evidence contrary
or unfavorable to the original determination .. ...

8

The court,

upon considering such contrary evidence, concluded that the commission decision was "not supported by substantial evidence conId. at 627, 506 P.2d at 784.
Id. (emphasis added).
18 N.M. St. B. Bull. 289 (May 3, 1979).
Id. at 291 (emphasis added).
The court did consider reports of two physicians submitted on behalf of the
losing claimant and found that "the physicians' reports are neither conclusive
nor dispositive ...
Id. at 291.
113. On the other hand, the supreme court in Tapia v. Panhandle Steel Erectors Co..
said, "[nior does the fact that there may have been contrary evidence which would have
supported a different verdict permit us to weigh the evidence." 78 N.M. 86, 89, 428 P.2d
625, 628 (1967).
114. 18 N.M. St. B. Bull. 545 (Ct. App. July 26, 1979).
115. N.M. Stat. Ann. §27-3-4(F) (1978).
116. Id.
117. 18 N.M. St. B. Bull. 545, 546 (Ct. App. July 26, 1979).
118. Id.at 547.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
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sidering the record as a whole."' 'I Thus when provided with a
statutory "whole record" standard, the court expressly considered
both favorable and unfavorable evidence, "not just that which supports the judgment as in other types of cases."' 2 0
CONCLUSION
In summary, the dominant New Mexico position seems to be the
one-sided substantial evidence rule, with the caveat that there are
legislative provisions for the "whole record" standard for some agencies. Even without legislative mandate, the court appears at times to
look at the whole record on review.
This ambiguity argues for clarification either by: 1) the adoption
by the legislature of a uniform approach for the judicial review of
administrative decisions through an administrative procedures act
that applies effectively to the administrative process, or 2) by the
adoption of a statement by the court resolving existing ambiguities
by expressly applying the whole record standard in all future reviews
of administrative decisions. In addition, that would be a propitious
time for the court to reconsider the efficacy of the legal residuum
rule.

119. Id.
120. Id. at 546.

